Security has evolved into a primary concern
that can no longer be taken for granted. The inherent security in
Windows 2008 is only as good as the services that have access to it;
therefore, you should perform a security audit of all systems that
access information from servers. This concept holds true for management
systems as well because they collect sensitive information from every
server in an enterprise. This includes potentially sensitive event logs
that could be used to compromise a system. Consequently, securing the
OpsMgr infrastructure should not be taken lightly.
Securing OpsMgr Agents
Each server that contains an OpsMgr agent and
forwards events to management servers has specific security
requirements. Server-level security should be established and should
include provisions for OpsMgr data collection. All traffic between
OpsMgr components, such as the agents, management servers, and database,
is encrypted automatically for security, so the traffic is inherently
secured.
In addition, environments with high security
requirements should investigate the use of encryption technologies such
as IPSec to scramble the event IDs sent between agents and OpsMgr
servers, to protect against eavesdropping of OpsMgr packets.
OpsMgr uses mutual authentication between agents and
management servers. This means that the agent must reside in the same
forest as the management server. If the agent is located in a different
forest or workgroup, client certificates can be used to establish mutual
authentication. If an entire nontrusted domain must be monitored, the
gateway server can be installed in the nontrusted domain, agents can
establish mutual authentication to the gateway server, and certificates
on the gateway and management server can be used to establish mutual
authentication. In this scenario, you can avoid placing a certificate on
each nontrusted domain member.
Understanding Firewall Requirements
OpsMgr
servers deployed across a firewall have special considerations that
must be taken into account. Port 5723, the default port for OpsMgr
communications, must specifically be opened on a firewall to enable
OpsMgr to communicate across it.
Table 1 describes communication for this and other OpsMgr components.
Table 1. OpsMgr Communication Ports
From | To | Port |
---|
Agent | Root Management Server | 5723 |
Agent | Management server | 5723 |
Agent | Gateway server | 5723 |
Agent (ACS forwarder) | Management server ACS collector | 51909 |
Gateway server | Root Management Server | 5723 |
Gateway server | Management server | 5723 |
Management or Gateway server | UNIX or Linux computer | 1270 |
Management or Gateway server | UNIX or Linux computer | 22 |
Management server | Operations Manager database | 1433 |
Management server | Root Management Server | 5723, 5724 |
Management server | Reporting data warehouse | 1433 |
Management server ACS collector | ACS database | 1433 |
Operations Console | Root Management Server | 5724 |
Operations Console (reports) | SQL Server Reporting Services | 80 |
Reporting server | Root Management Server | 5723, 5724 |
Reporting server | Reporting data warehouse | 1433 |
Root Management Server | Operations Manager database | 1433 |
Root Management Server | Reporting data warehouse | 1433 |
Web Console browser | Web Console server | 51908 |
Web Console server | Root Management Server | 5724 |
The agent is the component that ports need to be
opened most often, which is only port 5723 from the agent to the
management servers for monitoring. Other ports, such as 51909 for ACS,
are more rarely needed. Figure 1 shows the major communications paths and ports between OpsMgr components.
Outlining Service Account Security
In
addition to the aforementioned security measures, security of an OpsMgr
environment can be strengthened by the addition of multiple service
accounts to handle the different OpsMgr components. For example, the
Management Server Action account and the SDK/Configuration service
account should be configured to use separate credentials to provide for
an extra layer of protection in the event that one account is
compromised.
Management Server Action account— The account responsible for collecting data and running responses from management servers.
SDK and Configuration service account— The account that writes data to the operations database; this service is also used for all console communication.
Local Administrator account— The account used during the agent push installation process. To install the agent, local administrative rights are required.
Agent Action account—
The credentials that the agent runs as. This account can run under a
built-in system account, such as Local System, or a limited domain user
account for high-security environments.
Data Warehouse Write Action account— The account used by the management server to write data to the reporting data warehouse.
Data Warehouse Reader account— The account used to read data from the data warehouse when reports are executed.
Run As accounts—
The specific accounts used by management packs to facilitate
monitoring. These accounts must be manually created and delegated
specific rights as defined in the management pack documentation. These
accounts are then assigned as run-as accounts used by the management
pack to achieve a high-degree of security and flexibility when
monitoring the environment.