Recalls: an industry time-bomb
waiting to blow? Scarred by its recalls scandal, GM warns globalisation could
trigger an epidemic of remedial work!
First Toyota recalled
10 million cars, now GM has been engulfed by a safety scandal that
requires remedial work for more than 20 million cars, and forced it to put
aside $2.5 billion so far to cover warranty work, before any law suits relating
to deaths and injuries.
First
Toyota recalled 10
million cars, now GM has been engulfed by a safety scandal that requires
remedial work for more than 20 million cars, and forced it to put aside $2.5
billion so far to cover warranty work, before any law suits relating to deaths
and injuries.
‘How we deal with this will define what people think of GM,’
company president Dan Ammann told CAR. ‘Our fundamental approach is we
need to address it, do the right thing for customers who are affected, by
fixing cars [and offering] compensation for accident victims. Even more
important is to configure the business so it never happens again.’ Like Toyota,
GM has been called before the United States Congress to apologise for, and
explain, the safety issue affecting cars on its Delta and Kappa platforms. In 2002,
GM engineers approved the installation of an ignition switch they knew was
defective; its lack of resistance meant the key could be knocked out of the
‘run’ position, stalling cars at speed and fatefully deactivating the airbags.
GM has identified at least 54 frontal impact crashes, involving more than a
dozen deaths, linked to the problem.
First
Toyota recalled 10
million cars, now GM has been engulfed by a safety scandal that requires
remedial work for more than 20 million cars, and forced it to put aside $2.5
billion so far to cover warranty work, before any law suits relating to deaths
and injuries.
A report commissioned by GM uncovered systemic
organisational failures: for 11 years, no-one took responsibility to flag the
problem as a safety issue and instigate a recall; the switch was changed around
2007 but no new part number issued, making it harder to identify which cars
posed a risk; and despite an external accident investigator identifying the
fault and its airbag implications in 2007, no-one at GM grasped this critical
knock-on effect of one in-car system on another.
That chain reaction has big consequences for car companies,
says Ammann: “Think of the car of 10 years ago and the car 10 years from now:
the technology and complexity is growing dramatically. Everything is highly
integrated and talking to everything else electronically. And the industry is
moving to very high volume architectures. There is more potential to go wrong
and on a scale basis.”
That chain
reaction has big consequences for car companies, says Ammann: “Think of the car
of 10 years ago and the car 10 years from now: the technology and complexity is
growing dramatically.
